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Abstract
There has been a growing interest, both in physics and psychology, in un-
derstanding contextuality in experimentally observed quantities. Different ap-
proaches have been proposed to deal with contextual systems, and a promising
one is contextuality-by-default, put forth by Dzhafarov and Kujala. The goal
of this paper is to present a tutorial on a different approach: negative proba-
bilities. We do so by presenting the overall theory of negative probabilities in a
way that is consistent with contextuality-by-default and by examining with this
theory some simple examples where contextuality appears, both in physics and
psychology.
Keywords: contextuality, extended probabilities, negative probabilities,
quantum cognition
1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increased interest in modeling psychological
experiments with the mathematical tools of Quantum Mechanics (QM) [9]. The
argument, already put forth by Bohr, is that the principle of complementarity
in QM is not unique to physical events, but is also present in cognitive and
social phenomena [33]. Since complementarity is ubiquitous, it should also be
true that the Hilbert space formalism created by physicists at the beginning of
the 20th Century can be applied to describe mathematical situations outside
of physics. This line of thinking gave rise in recent times to a thriving line of
research known as Quantum Interaction and, more specifically in the context of
psychology, Quantum Cognition.
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At the core of complementarity is the idea that it is not possible, in principle,
to observe simultaneously certain characteristics of a system. In physics, this is
the case for the well-known wave/particle duality: each experimental context de-
termines which characteristic, undulatory or corpuscular, is observed. Similarly,
it was proposed that complementarity in psychology appears when a subject has
to deal with situations that have different and incompatible contexts. The key
aspect of complementarity, for our purpose, is that of a dependency on the con-
text. Therefore, quantum mathematical models, and also quantum cognition,
are essentially descriptions of contextual observables.
That the mathematical apparatus of QM is well suited to describe those
context-dependent observables found in physics is clear by the tremendous suc-
cess of this theory to not only describe the microscopic world but also to predict
surprising results. This success comes from the fact that complementarity, with
its prohibition of simultaneous observation of certain quantities, implies an or-
thomodular lattice of propositions pertaining to the observable events, instead
of a classic Boolean algebra of compatible observables. In a famous paper, Piron
[49] proved that the orthomodular lattice of propositions have a representation
in terms of Hilbert spaces. Therefore, it stands to reason that Hilbert spaces
are a good candidate for modeling the probabilities of quantities that may not
be simultaneously observable. In other words, the mathematics of QM is a well-
suited extension of probability theory that offer a way to model the probabilistic
outcomes of contextual observables [8].
However, the mathematical structure of QM does not come without a price.
First, it is not the most universal generalization of probabilities for context-
dependent systems. It is possible to imagine certain context-dependent situa-
tions of interest to researchers outside of physics which the Hilbert space for-
malism of QM fails to describe (see [16] for an example). Second, the quantum
formalism predicts some results that are not reasonable in, say, psychology. For
instance, one important result is the impossibility to clone an unknown quantum
system, which is related to the impossibility of superluminal signaling. There
is no analogue to this in psychology, and one should not expect the cloning of
“cognitive states” to be impossible in principle (for instance, in principle, albeit
not in practice, we could conceive of duplicating all the neural states of a given
brain, with their corresponding firings and configurations).
It is thus reasonable to ask what other ways of describing contextual sys-
tems exist. This has been a matter of intense research in the past few years, and
in this paper we provide one possible tool: Negative Probabilities (NP). Our
purpose here is to lay out the main ideas necessary to describe certain contex-
tual systems with NP. To do so, we organize this paper as follows. In Section
2, we start with a definition of contextuality, in line with the recent work of
Dzhafarov and Kujala [28]. In Section 3 we go into the mathematical details of
negative probabilities, and discuss possible interpretations. Finally, in Section
4 we present some examples and applications of NP.
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Figure 1: A firefly inside the box, whose position is represented on the horizontal plane by the
white dot on top of the box, shines its light at a certain instant of time. The box is designed
such that if the firefly is on the left hand side of A, then only this side lights up, but the exact
position of the insect on this plane cannot be inferred (similarly for B). Due to experimental
constraints (also by design, we cannot look at both sides A and B simultaneously), even
though the actual position of the firefly is given by, in the figure, left on A and right on B, we
only know one at a time, but do not know them jointly (i.e., knowing A is left does not tell
us what the value of B is, which in this case is either right or left).
2. Contextuality
To understand what we mean by contextuality, we need to lay down some
notation to describe it. Let us start with a formal definition of probabilities,
which will be useful later on, when we modify it to allow for contextual systems.
We follow Kolmogorov’s axiomatic approach based on set theory in general[42],
but for the present paper, will only need to use finite probability spaces.
A discrete probability space is determined by the triple (Ω,F , p), where Ω is
the set of elementary events, F is the algebra of events (which can be taken as
the powerset 2ω for our purposes), and p : F → [0, 1] is a function that yields
the probability of each event S ∈ F . The elementary events define the most
atomic outcomes of an experiment, and so the probability of a general event S
is determined by the probabilities of elementary events: p(S) =
∑
ω∈S p({ω}).
It is important to note that one generally cannot observe the elementary
events directly. Let us explain what we mean with the well-known firefly box
[31], which will be useful later on when we introduce the concept of contextuality.
Imagine we have a box with a firefly inside it emitting light at random times.
The box is constructed such that its walls are translucent, but an observer can
only see one side of the box at a time (see Figure 1). A possible Ω may be the
set of all possible joint values of A and B, namely {RR,RL,LR,LL}, where
RR corresponds to the firefly lighting up the right side of A and right side of
B, RL to right side of A and left of B, and so on1. For this Ω, the elementary
event RR is never actually observed, since to observe it means seeing both sides
of the box simultaneously, which is forbidden by experimental design.
In the firefly box, the set of elementary events could be even more fine
grained. For instance, it could be {TRTR, TRTL, . . . , BLBR, BLBL}, where,
1Here, for our purposes, we discard the possible state where the firefly is not blinking.
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e.g., TRBL corresponds to the firefly being on the top of the right side of A
and on the bottom of the left side on B. Then, if one observed the firefly on
the left of A, any of the following elementary events might be result in this:
TLTR, TLTL,TLBR,TLBL, BLTR, BLTL,BLBR,BLBL. If we were to compute
the probability of the event “left of A” happens, we would have to take the
conjunction of all those elementary events, which once again are not directly
observable.
The previous discussion motivates the idea of a random variable, a very im-
portant tool in modeling experimental outcomes. Intuitively, random variables
(r.v.) are mathematical representations of outcomes of an experiment which
may be stochastic, such as the outcomes of the firefly box, which are only “left
on A,” “right on A,” “left on B,” or “right on B,” abbreviated by LA, RA, LB , and
RB , respectively. Random variables model this experiment in the following way.
We start with a probability space, whose elementary events in Ω are sampled
according to p. For this probability space, we choose functions A : Ω→ {−1, 1}
and B : Ω → {−1, 1} such that for a random sampling of elementary events
ω ∈ Ω following p, the probabilities of the outcomes A(ω) = −1, A(ω) = 1,
B(ω) = −1, and B(ω) = 1, (which are given by respectively p(A = −1),
p(A = 1), p(B = −1), and p(B = 1)), are the same as the probabilities of
observing “left on A”, “right on A”, “left on B”, “right on B”, respectively. In
other words, what random variables do is set a partition on Ω such that each
element of this partition (which is in F) corresponds to an outcome of the ex-
periment with the same probabilistic features. Thus, a discrete random variable
is formally a function Ω → E from the probability space to a certain set E
of possible values. For our example above, the random variables A and B are
±1-valued, with E = {−1, 1}.
The expected value of a random variable R or, for short, the expectation of
R, on a probability space (Ω,F , p), denoted E (R), is defined as
E (R) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p ({ω})R (ω) .
For two random variables R and S, their moment is defined as the expectation
of their product, E (RS), and for three random variables R, S, and T, their
triple moment is defined as the expectation of the triple product, E (RST).
Higher moments, are defined in the same way, as product expectations of four
or more random variables.
So, the question is whether we can create random variables A and B that
model the firefly box. What we mean here is whether there exists a probability
space (Ω,F , p) and discrete random variables on this space such that all sta-
tistical characteristics of the outcomes of observations of the box are the same
as the statistical characteristics of the random variables. For example, if we
observe “left on A” 50% of the time, then it must be the case that E (A) = 0 for
a r.v. A taking values ±1. Notice however that because we only observe A or
B, we cannot know what the value of the second moment E (AB) is, and any
probability spaces and r.v.’s on them satisfying the observed marginals E (A)
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Figure 2: Three-sided firefly box. As before, a firefly is present inside the box, blinking at
random times. When it blinks, because of the translucency of the walls, only one of face’s
side lights up. In this setup, only two sides can be observed simultaneously (e.g., A and C,
but not B).
and E (B) would be adequate. It is easy to prove that for this firefly box, we
can always find a (Ω,F , p) consistent with all observed marginals2.
However, a common probability space does not always exist for r.v’s rep-
resenting a collection of properties that cannot all be observed simultaneously.
To see this, let us consider a slightly more complicated firefly example. Imagine
a box, shown in Figure 2, where we can observe not only A and B, but also
the top, C. The outcomes of an observation will modeled by ±1-valued random
variables, A, B, and C, corresponding to which side of the cube’s face glows
(marked in the figure with + and − ). It is clear that there is a one-one cor-
respondence between the region inside the cube and what values the random
variables take if the firefly blinks. For example, the faces of the cube divide
it naturally into octants, and if the firefly is in one octant, the value of A, B,
and C will be determined. We can think of the firefly blinking in one octant
as corresponding to an elementary event in the sample space of a probability
space (Ω,F , p), and we can label them according to the values of A, B, and C,
i.e. Ω =
{
ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc
}
, where we use the notation
that the subscripts correspond to the outcome of the random variables, with
the barred ones being −1 and the other +1 (e.g., ωabc corresponds to the octant
where A = 1, B = −1, and C = 1).
Let us further assume that, like the two-sided box of Figure 1, we cannot
observe all three sides at the same time, but only two. This means that we
do not only have access to the values of E (A), E (B), and E (C), but also to
their second moments, E (AB), E (BC), and E (AC), (which together with
the individual expectations fully determine the joint distribution of each pair
of random variables). It is easy to see that if we start with the above sample
space, we can impose constraints on the values of the moments. To see this,
consider the following table:
2For instance, we can just choose a (Ω,F , p) such that A and B are statistically indepen-
dent, i.e. E (AB) = 0, since the moment is not observable by construction.
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AB AC BC AB+AC+BC
ωabc +1 +1 +1 +3
ωabc −1 −1 +1 −1
ωabc −1 +1 −1 −1
ωabc +1 −1 −1 −1
ωabc −1 −1 +1 −1
ωabc −1 +1 −1 −1
ωabc +1 −1 −1 −1
ωabc +1 +1 +1 +3
Given that the table holds for individual values, the expected value for each of
the columns3 are simply a convex combination of their values (which weights
for this convex combination depends on the particular values of the observed
expectations). An immediate consequence is that for the probability space given,
the moments must be always such that
− 1 ≤ E (AB) + E (AC) + E (BC) , (1)
which is the right-hand-side of the Suppes-Zanotti inequalities [53]. In other
words, if there is a probability space that describes all the moments for A, B,
and C, then inequality (1) must be satisfied.
Here we point out that violations of inequality [53] correspond to violations
of logical consistency, as indicated by Abramsky and Hardy [3]. To violate
[53], we need in the convex combination of elements at least some events that
lead to values on the right column that are less than -1. One such element, for
example, is E (AB) = E (AC) = E (BC) = −1, which adds up to −3. For these
moments, if A = 1, then E (AB) implies B = −1, and from E (BC) it follows
that C = 1, which finally leads, from E (AC), to A = −1, a contradiction.
The contradiction comes from the assumption that, say, the random variable
A in the experiment that measures E (AB) is the same as the ones in the
experiment E (AC). However, as we will see, this is not the case, and outcomes
of experiments can depend on contexts.
To show this let us we tweak the firefly example. As we mentioned, the box
in Figure 2 is designed such that one can only observe two sides at a time. This
could be done by having some mechanism attached to the box that prevents
the observer to see what happens on one of the sides. Let us now connect
the mechanism that selects which sides we can observe to a biasing mechanism
inside the box. This biasing mechanism turns on (inside the box) little devices
that release at random times4 pheromones that attract the firefly. If we place
those pheromone-releasing devices in the right place, we can rig the box such
that we have higher probabilities of finding the firefly only in certain octants.
Furthermore, by a careful choice of octants, we can have it built such that the
3The quantity AB+AC+BC is itself a random variable.
4But with expected time intervals that are of the same order of the expected period in
between blinks for the firefly.
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Figure 3: Contextual firefly box with two observables at a time. On the left hand side we
have the possible octants where the firefly is when (A,B) are observed, and in the middle
(A,C) and (B,C) (bottom). After the equal signs we have the intersection between (A,B)
and (A,C) (top right) and between (A,B) and (B,C) (bottom right). It is clear that the
intersection between those scenarios lead to the empty set, an impossible event.
second moment of, say, A and B, is close to −1. Because the pheromone-
releasing mechanism is connected to the side-selection mechanism, we can also
make it change when we decide to observe B and C or A and C, such that
their second moment is also −1. Of course, E (AB) = E (AC) = E (BC) ≈ −1
violates (1).
What is happening in the previous example is simple: inequalities (1) are vio-
lated because each observational setting, i.e. the decision of which two variables
to observe, corresponds to a different experimental condition. This is because
the choice of observing A and B instead of any other pair changes the places
where the pheromones are being released. In other words, the probability space
(Ω,F , p) assumes that the values of the random variables A in the experiment
withB are compatible withA in the experiment withC. But such compatibility
is impossible. To illustrate this in a different way, let us examine what happens
to the octants as we impose the moments E (AB) = E (AC) = E (BC) = −1.
As we saw above, the sample space Ω is represented in terms of the octants, one
for each elementary event in Ω =
{
ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc
}
.
To reproduce the E (AB) = −1 observation (when C is not observable), the
firefly would need to be in the two regions denoted by the two prisms on the
left hand side of Figure 3. The further constraint that E (AC) = −1 leads to a
smaller region of the sample space, corresponding to only two cubes (center top
on Figure 3). But that implies that E (BC) = 1, and there are no points in the
sample space that correspond to E (AB) = E (AC) = E (BC) = −1 (this, by
the way, is straightforward from our table above, and is also shown pictorially
in Figure 3). Therefore, the regions where the firefly is depends on which sides
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of the box you are observing. This characteristic is called contextuality.
Thus, contextuality, for us, can be stated in the following way. If a set of
random variables, measured under different experimental conditions and never
all at the same time, cannot be represented as partitions of a joint probability
distribution, then they are contextual. From our example it should be clear
that the nonexistence of a joint probability distribution for contextual random
variables was not based on taking a coarse-grained probability space over the
firefly’s path. But to make it explicit, we can notice that any probability space
that reproduces the outcomes of A, B, and C must have as part of its algebra
the elements pabc, . . . , pabc, and therefore it cannot have a proper probability
distribution over it.
Following the Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) approach [28, 25, 44], one
should assume that different experiments (e.g, observing (A,B), observing (B,C),
and observing (A,C) in the above example) are stochastically unrelated and
therefore modeled on distinct probability spaces. Indeed, only one experiment
can be performed at a time so there is no pairing-scheme to justify defining the
random variables of different experiments on the same probability space.
Thus, indexing properties by subscripts i = 1, . . . ,M and different contexts
by superscripts j = 1, . . . , N , let us model the result of observing property i
in context j by the random variable Rji : Ωj → Ei, where Rji with different i
but same j are all jointly distributed but Rji and R
j′
i′ for j 6= j′ are stochasti-
cally unrelated for all i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, equal or not. For keeping the notation
uncluttered, we assume that when property i does not appear in context j,
the expression Rji is undefined and left out from any enumerations. Using this
convention, we denote by Rj = {Rji : i = 1, . . . ,m} the jointly distributed set
of random variables modeling the measurement of all properties appearing in
context j.
Definition 1. A collection of random variables Rji is said to be consistently
connected if Rji ∼ Rj
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all contexts j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} in
which the property i appears (here we use the notation A ∼ B to signify that
“A has the same distribution as B”). If a system is not consistently connected,
it is said to be inconsistently connected.
Intuitively, consistently connected means that one cannot find differences
between a random variable in one context and another by solely observing this
random variable5. For example, if we observe A in the context of B, and we
then observe A in the context of C, no scrutiny of the distribution or values
of A can tell us which context it was observed in if the random variables are
consistently connected.
Random variables that are not consistently connected are obviously context-
dependent. As we will see in Section 4 below, many of the examples in physics
and psychology are context-dependent because of being inconsistently connected.
5This, by the way, is related to the no-signaling condition in physics.
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However, it is still possible for a system of random variables to present contex-
tuality even if they are consistently connected, and we need to distinguish those
cases. This is the essence of the following definitions.
Definition 2. A coupling of random variables X1, . . . ,Xn (that may be defined
on different probability spaces) is any jointly distributed set of random variables
Z1, . . . ,Zn such that X1 ∼ Z1, . . . , Xn ∼ Zn.
Intuitively, a coupling imposes a joint distribution on a set of random vari-
ables and hence formalizes the concept of finding a common sample space for a
set of random variables. Thus, we can define the traditional understanding of
(non-)contextuality in a mathematically rigorous form as follows.
Definition 3. A collection of random variables Rji is non-contextual if and
only if there exists a coupling Q1, . . . ,Qn of R1, . . .Rn such that Qji = Q
j′
i
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all contexts j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} in which the property i
appears.
Definition 3 only holds for consistently connected systems, as it requires, as
its consequence, that Rji ∼ Rj
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all contexts j, j′ ∈
{1, . . . , n} in which property i appears. If the coupling of Definition 3 exists,
we can denote Qi = Q
j
i = Q
j′
i = . . . for all i = 1, . . . ,m and all contexts
j, j′, · · · ∈ {1, . . . , n} in which the property i appears. We can think intuitively of
the distributions ofRj ’s as observable marginal distributions of the hypothetical
larger system Q1, . . . ,Qm. Thus, the collection of r.v.’s is non-contextual if it
is possible to “sew” the observed marginal probabilities together to produce a
larger probability distribution over the whole set of properties [27, 24, 18, 22].
As mentioned, in Quantum Mechanics, and perhaps Psychology, it may not be
possible to do that, but in many cases the marginal probabilities are compatible
with a signed joint probability distribution of Q1, . . . ,Qm.
We are now left with the following three situations for collections of r.v.’s
measured under different contexts: they are non-contextual (i.e., they can be
imposed on a proper joint probability distribution in which r.v’s representing
the same property are always equal); the random variables are contextual and
consistently connected (in the next section, we show that they can then be
imposed on a signed joint distribution); and they are inconsistently connected6.
For inconsistently connected systems, things are a little more subtle, and since
NP cannot yet deal with them, we refer to the works of Dzhafarov and Kujala
[44, 43].
6Here we should add a comment on terminology. In the CbD approach, the definition of
noncontextuality is extended [25, 23] to inconsistently connected systems by allowing Qji =
Qj
′
i = . . . to not hold as long as the probability of it holding is in a certain well-defined
sense maximal for each i. This allows one to detect contextuality on top of inconsistent
connectedness and so in the most recent terminology of CbD, a system can be inconsistently
connected and yet not contextual. For the present paper, since we are mostly focusing on the
NP approach which does not apply to inconsistently connected system, it suffices to use the
traditional understanding of contextuality.
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3. Negative Probabilities
As we mentioned in the previous section, contextuality appears not only
in psychology but also in physical systems. In this Section we describe one
possible approach to describing contextuality: Negative Probabilities (NP). NP
are a generalization of standard Kolmogorovian probabilities to accommodate
the observations performed in a system that behaves in a contextual way.
It is important at this point to understand why changing the theory of
probability is a desirable approach. When we have context-dependent r.v.’s,
such as theA, B, and C in the firefly box, one could argue that the nonexistence
of a joint probability distribution comes from a mistake: the identification of a
random variable, say A, in two different contexts (e.g. (A,B) and (A,C) as
being the same). This is clearly what is happening, and the solution to it is,
following Dzhafarov and Kujala’s Contextuality-by-Default approach, to clearly
label each r.v. according to its context. However, there are cases when such
distinction may not highlight important non-trivial features of a system. One
such case is the famous Bell-EPR experiment, which we describe below. For this
experiment, because the experiments that measure, e.g., A and B should not
interfere with each other, for physical reasons, it makes no sense to label them
differently. However, the Bell-EPR system is contextual, and using the same
label brings this contextuality to the surface in a very dramatic way. Therefore
an extended probability theory may help shed light in some of those contextual
cases.
Because contextuality is equivalent to the non-existence of a joint probability
distribution (see Proposition 4 below) for a collection of random variables, some
proposals for dealing with contextual systems are to simply change the theory
of probability. This is what was done in quantum mechanics, where the comple-
mentarity principle, whereupon some variables were forbidden in principle to be
observed simultaneously, opened up the need to describe such contextual sys-
tems with the formalism of measures over Hilbert spaces. However, a question
in QM is what are the principles behind such a specific generalized probability
theory? Why do we use Hilbert spaces? These questions form an important
topic of research, and are yet unanswered. Similarly, these questions can also
be asked for psychology. Why is the quantum formalism adequate to model
psychological systems? Up to now, it seems that all arguments about using the
quantum formalism are related to specific examples that form a subset of those
in physics, since they all involve inconsistently connected systems.
So, instead of using quantum probabilities, as do researchers in quantum
cognition, we propose a more general framework given by negative probabili-
ties. Our definition of NP is a straightforward generalization of Kolmogorov’s
probability. A discrete signed probability space is given by a triple (Ω,F , p) with
the same components as a proper probability space, except that the function
p : Ω→ R is allowed to attain negative values and values larger than 1, as long
as it still satisfies p(Ω) = 1. The probability of an event E ∈ F is still calculated
as p(S) =
∑
ω∈S p({ω}), like in proper probability spaces, and random variables
and expectations are defined analogously to those of proper probability spaces.
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Let us motivate the above definition. First, we notice that, in Definition 3,
contextuality was defined as the impossibility to impose a joint distribution on
R1, . . . ,Rn such that the stochastically unrelated random variables representing
the same property are always equal in this joint. However, for consistently
connected systems, it turns out it is always possible to find such a joint on a
signed probability space:
Proposition 4. For a collection Rji of discrete r.v.’s on finite sample spaces,
the following are equivalent
1. there exists on a signed probability space jointly distributed r.v.’sQ1, . . . ,Qm
such that for all j = 1, . . . , n, it holds {Rji ,Rji′ , . . . } ∼ {Qi,Qi′ , . . . } where
i, i′, . . . are the properties appearing in context j. (Here “∼” is taken to re-
fer to the joint distributions of the two sets of r.v.’s).
2. the collection Rji is consistently connected.
Proof. See [1, 5, 46].
Definition 5. Let Rji be a consistently connected collection of r.v.’s. Then,
the minimum L1 probability norm, denoted M∗, or simply minimum probability
norm, is given by M∗ = min
∑
ω∈Ω |p ({ω})|, where the minimization is over
all signed probability spaces (Ω,F , p) and r.v.’s Q1, . . . ,Qn on it that satisfy
condition 1 of Proposition 4.
From this definition it is easy to prove the following:
Proposition 6. A consistently connected collection of r.v.’s is non-contextual
if and only if M∗ = 1.
Proof. See [22].
If follows that since M∗ can be greater than one for contextual systems, and
that the greater the value of M∗ the further away from a proper probability
distribution it lies (due to the strong relationships imposed, e.g., by the mo-
ments of the random variables), it is natural to interpret M∗ as a measure of
contextuality: the larger the value of M∗, the more contextual the system [18].
From Proposition 4, it follows that inconsistently connected systems of ran-
dom variables cannot be described with negative probabilities. Here we are left
with only one possibility. If, for a system of random variables, some of them are
not consistently connected, then we need to face the fact that they are not the
same random variable, and label them accordingly, following the prescription of
Contextuality-by-Default [28, 26].
We end this Section with some comments about the meaning of NP. One of
the main obstacles to the use of NP is the lack of an interpretation. After all,
what meaning should we give to them? If probabilities are, as in some objective
views, given by relative frequencies of actual realizable events, how can we even
consider a probability to be negative?
First, we should point out that NP are not directly observable, but only
inferrable. For instance, in the firefly box, negative probabilities appear exactly
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because we cannot observe all three sides simultaneously (or know where the
firefly is). Were we able to observe all three simultaneously, then a joint prob-
ability distribution would necessarily exist. With the observable moments, any
attempt to create probabilities that have marginals consistent with the moments
lead to NP.
Our second point is that NP may be useful in certain applications. For
example, in physics an important question is what are the physical principles
that define QM. NP may be an adequate tool to help us understand those
principles. We will not explore this application of NP here, but the interested
reader is referred to [46, 47].
That said, there are ways to interpret NP, even consistently with a frequentist
interpretation. Here we will briefly sketch how some of those interpretations
work, but the interested reader should refer to the cited references. We start
with Andrei Khrennikov’s p-adic interpretation. Khrennikov [34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39] showed that for the frequentist interpretation proposed by von Mises,
where probabilities are defined as the convergent ratio of infinite sequences,
NP appear in sequences where the usual Archimedian metric does not converge
to a specific value (i.e., sequences not satisfying the principle of stabilization).
When Archimedian metrics do not converge, p-adic metrics may do so, and in
those cases NP appear as the p-adic limiting case. In other words, Khrennikov
interprets infinite sequences that do not satisfy the principle of stabilization as
arising from contextuality, and describable by negative probabilities. However,
the relationship between NP and observations, in this interpretation, is not
straightforward, as it depends on the particular p-adic metric chosen.
Another interpretation of NP, also frequentist, is the one proposed by Abram-
sky and Brandenburger [1, 2]. They use, in the context of sheaf theory, the
concept that events may have two different types that may annihilate each
other. In most circumstances, when quantities are observed, no events are
annihilated; however, when there are context-dependent observables, they are
context-dependent because each context determines a different interaction be-
tween the observables through their annihilation.
Finally there is Szekely’s “half-coin” interpretation of NP [50, 54]. The idea
is that two probability distributions that are negative may give rise to a non-
negative proper probability distribution. In this interpretation, negative prob-
abilities P are related to a proper probability p via a convolution equation
P ∗ p− = p+, which is always possible to be found [50, 54]. This convolution
means that for a random variable X whose (negative) probability distribution
is P , there exists two other random variables, X+ and X− with proper prob-
ability distributions (p+ and p−, respectively) and such that X = X+ − X−.
As one can see, this interpretation is closely related to that of Abramsky and
Brandenburger.
In this paper we favor a more pragmatic “interpretation.” Negative prob-
abilities are taken here to be simply an accounting tool, one that provides us
the best subjective information about systems which do not have an objective
probability distribution, as it is the closest distribution to a proper one (via
normalization of the L1 norm). This is analogous to the use of negative num-
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bers in mathematics, which was considered by many absurd. For example, the
famous mathematician Augustus De Morgan wrote the following about negative
numbers [45, pg. 72].
“Above all, he [the student] must reject the definition still sometimes
given of the quantity−a, that it is less than nothing. It is astonishing
that the human intellect should ever have tolerated such an absurdity
as the idea of a quantity less than nothing; above all, that the notion
should have outlived the belief in judicial astrology and the existence
of witches, either of which is ten thousand times more possible.”
However, nowadays we understand that negative numbers can be a useful book-
keeping device. For example, when tracking a store inventory, one would not
be overly concerned about something such as “−30 rolls of toilet paper” in our
spreadsheet, and equate such a line to “the existence of witches.” We approach
NP the same way, asking whether it can be a useful device that may not only
help us in computations but also give us further insights in some situations, as
mentioned above. But, as De Morgan, we consider a statement such as “event
A has probability −0.1” on equal terms with judicial astrology.
4. Some examples and applications
Let us now examine some examples of contextual systems, and how they can
be described (or not) with negative probabilities. We already gave an example of
a contextual system above, with the A, B, C random variables from the three-
sided firefly box. Here we will look at examples from physics, in particular
Quantum Mechanics, and then move to psychology7.
Perhaps the most important example of contextuality in physics is the double-
slit experiment, as it contains in its essence the complementarity principle. So,
here we start this section with this experiment, but in a simplified version given
by the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, which captures the main features of com-
plementarity. We then re-examine the firefly box in more details, showing how
negative probabilities can model some of its outcomes. Next, we review the
first example where contextuality was recognized as playing a key role in Quan-
tum Mechanics, the famous Kochen-Specker theorem [41]. Finally, as a last
physics example, we investigate the Bell-EPR with negative probabilities. We
then move to the contextual cases in quantum cognition, and we discuss how
those are related to the different physics cases shown before. We end this sec-
tion with a discussion of negative probabilities as a possible way to measure the
contextuality of an observable system.
7For some of our physics examples, we assume that the reader is familiar with the math-
ematical formalism of QM. Readers not familiar with it may wish to skip the details, since
they do not affect the overall understanding of this paper, or may refer to the many available
texts on this subject (e.g. [12] or [48]).
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Figure 4: Mach Zehnder Interferometer (MZI). A source S sends a particle beam that im-
pinges on the first beam splitter BS. The beam is them divided by BS into equal-intensity
(i.e. particle numbers, on average) beams that travel to both arms (paths) A and B of the
interferometer, reflecting on surfaces MA and MB . The beams from arms A and B are then
recombined in the second beam splitter. The outcomes are the two beams detected at D1 and
D2.
4.1. Interference experiments
In the double-slit experiment, a particle impinges on a solid barrier that has
on it two small and parallel slits close to each other. The particle has a probabil-
ity of passing through the slits, later on being detected on a scintillating screen.
Contextuality in this experiment appears as a manifestation of the wave/particle
duality: the places where the screen scintillates depend on whether we know any
which-path information for the particle, i.e., whether the particle went through
one slit and not the other (see [30] for a detailed discussion of the double slit).
Since the detection rates of an observed event depend on the context, it is
immediate that the double-slit experiment exhibits trivial contextuality. It thus
follows that it cannot be described using negative probabilities8. However, due
to its importance in many applications of the quantum formalism to psychology,
we present a brief discussion of it here in a simplified form. To do so, we use
a conceptually similar setup where the slits and the screen are replaced by
the Mach-Zehnder interferometer shown in Figure (see Figure 4; for a more
detailed discussion of the MZI, see references [22, 21]). Beam splitters send the
particles into two directions in a random way, such that if we place a particle
detector after each of the outputs of the beam splitter, we will see that in the
long run the number of particles going to one side approaches that of going to
the other side. After the first beam splitter, some reflecting surfaces redirect
the beams to another beam splitter, and the beams are recombined. From
QM, the whole system can be described mathematically by a wavefunction,
8Except if one makes special counterfactual assumptions, as common in certain physics
experiments [19, 22].
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and the recombination of the two beams in the second beam splitter leads to
an interference effect. Careful positioning of the beam splitters and reflecting
surfaces allow for perfect interference, namely all particles reaching D1 and none
reaching D2.
What makes the MZI interesting is that the placement of a detector on either
path A or path B causes a collapse of the wavefunction, thus changing the
outcomes of a measurement of D1 and D2: they now have the same probability
of detecting a particle. However, let us recall that if no detectors are placed
on A or B, the particle has zero probability of reaching D2. Furthermore, if
we simply block one of the paths, say by putting a barrier in A, half of the
particles going through B will reach D2. This is seemingly disturbing, for how
can we increase the probability of detection of D2 when we actually decrease the
number of ways in which the particle can reach D2? This is the main difficulty
of the double-slit experiment.
To see that the observations of D1 and D2 are contextual, let P and D
be two ±1-valued random variables representing which-path information and
detection: P = 1 if the particle is detected on A and P = −1 otherwise, D = 1
if the particle is detected in D1 and D = −1 otherwise. The MZI has two
contexts: there is a detector on A or B, providing which-path information,
or no detector. D measured under the no-which-path context has expected
value E (D) = 1, whereas a joint measurement of D and P gives as marginal
expectation the result E (D) = 0. Thus, according to the above definition, D is
inconsistently connected.
So, since it is inconsistently connected, how would we model the MZI with
NP? The fact thatD changes when measured withP or not leads to the necessity
of defining two different random variables, D and DP, where DP is simply
the representation of the detectors under the which-path information context.
Clearly we can always write down a joint probability distribution for P, D, and
DP, but then there is no contextuality in this system, and no need for negative
probabilities.
4.2. Three-sided Firefly Box
For the three-sided firefly box of Figure 2, Suppes and Zanotti proved a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a joint probability distri-
bution, namely that A, B, and C need to satisfy the following inequalities:
− 1 ≤ E (AB) + E (BC) + E (AC) (2)
≤ 1 + 2 min {E (AB) , E (BC) , E (AC)} .
This example actually shows up in physics, and a weaker form of inequalities
(2) are known in the physics literature as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. If we
restrict our variables to consistently connected systems, it is straightforward to
compute a (negative) joint probability distribution consistent with expectations
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violating (2). In fact, imagine we have the following moments
E(AB) = 1,
E(BC) = 2,
E(AC) = 3.
To make the computations simpler, let us also assume that E (A) = E (B) =
E (C) = 0. Then, we can construct a (negative) probability space (Ω,F , P )
with Ω =
{
ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc, ωabc
}
, and a P satisfying the
above marginals is given by
p (ωabc) =
1
4
(1 + 1 + 2 + 3)− α,
p (ωabc) =
1
4
(α− 1 − 2) ,
p
(
ωabc
)
=
1
8
(−1 + 1 − 2 + 3) ,
p (ωabc) =
1
8
(1 + 1 − 2 − 3) ,
p
(
ωabc
)
=
1
4
(1 + 3)− α,
p (ωabc) =
1
8
(1− 1 + 2 − 3) ,
p
(
ωabc
)
=
1
8
(1 + 1 − 2 − 3) ,
p
(
ωabc
)
= α,
where α is a free parameter that takes a range of values given by the moments 1,
2, and 3 and by the minimization of the L1 norm. Notice that if the moments
violate (2), then some of the probabilities above will be negative, regardless of
the values of α, as we should expect.
To see what further information negative probabilities may provide, we follow
an example from [15, 20]. Imagine a decision-maker, Deana, who wants to invest
in stocks. She considers three companies, A, B, and C, about which she knows
nothing. In a wise move, Deana hires three “experts,” Alice, Bob, and Carlos,
to provide her with information about the companies. However, each expert is
specialized only in two of the companies, but not in all (e.g. Alice knows a lot
about A and B, but nothing about C). Imagine now that the ±1-valued random
variables, A, B, and C, are supposed to model the experts’ beliefs of a stock
value going up if +1 and down if −1 whenever asked about it. We assume that
our experts’ opinions about each company A, B, or C are consistently connected,
i.e. they all agree about the expectations of A, B, and C. To make it simple
for our toy example, we set
E (A) = E (B) = E (C) = 0. (3)
Since Alice only knows about A and B, she can add to (3) information about
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the second moment, and she claims
EA (AB) = −1, (4)
where we use the subscript A to remind us that (4) corresponds to Alice’s
subjective belief9. Equation (4) has a simple interpretation: Alice believes that
if the value of A goes up, B will certainly go down and vice versa. Bob’s and
Carlos’s beliefs are that
EB (AC) = −1
2
, (5)
and
EC (BC) = 0. (6)
It is easy to see from (2) that (4)–(6) do not have a proper joint probability
distribution. However, because the random variables are consistently connected,
there exists a negative probability distribution consistent with (3)–(6).
What can Deana do with her inconsistent expert information? The only
unknown to Deanna, in a certain sense, is the triple moment. The minimization
of the L1 norm provides a range of possible values for the triple moments,
namely, for the above expectations,
−1
2
≤ E (XYZ) ≤ 1
2
.
So, NP provide a range of possible values for the triple moment that could be
thought as the most reasonable range, given that the minimization of L1 puts
the negative measure as close to a proper probability distribution as possible.
4.3. Kochen-Specker Theorem
Very early on, a heated discussion in the foundations of quantum mechanics
was whether the process of measuring a quantum system revealed the actual
value of a property or created it. To answer this question, Kochen and Specker
[41] asked whether it was possible to assign values 0 or 1 to a set of quantum
properties (corresponding to projection operators, the quantum equivalent to
yes/no measurements). If measurements revealed a property, then this assign-
ment of 0 and 1 values should be possible, but Kochen and Specker showed this
was not the case. To do so, they used 117 projection operators (projectors).
However, a simpler proof with only 18 projectors in a four dimensional Hilbert
space exists, and that form is followed here. [10]. Let Pi be a collection of
projectors, and let Vi be ±1-valued random variables taking values −1 or +1
depending on whether the property Pi is false or true, respectively. Since Pi is
determined uniquely by a vector in the Hilbert space, we use this vector as the
index i for the projector and the random variable. Consider the following set
9Our example is not easily translatable into objective probabilities, but one could devise a
situation where certain biases on the experts sides could increase their assessment of second
moments, thus recreating the moments we use.
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of equations, guaranteed to be satisfied by the algebra of the chosen projection
operators.
V0,0,0,1V0,0,1,0V1,1,0,0V1,−1,0,0 = −1, (7)
V0,0,0,1V0,1,0,0V1,0,1,0V1,0,−1,0 = −1, (8)
V1,−1,1,−1V1,−1,−1,1V1,1,0,0V0,0,1,1 = −1, (9)
V1,−1,1,−1V1,1,1,1V1,0,−1,0V0,1,0,−1 = −1, (10)
V0,0,1,0V0,1,0,0V1,0,0,1V1,0,0,−1 = −1, (11)
V1,−1,−1,1V1,1,1,1V1,0,0,−1V0,1,−1,0 = −1, (12)
V1,1,−1,1V1,1,1,−1V1,−1,0,0V0,0,1,1 = −1, (13)
V1,1,−1,1V−1,1,1,1V1,0,1,0V0,1,0,−1 = −1, (14)
V1,1,1,−1V−1,1,1,1V1,0,0,1V0,1,−1,0 = −1. (15)
A quick examination will reveal that the r.v.’s on each line correspond to a set
of commuting projectors. Because the Pi in each line are orthogonal, only one
of the Vi’s in each line can be true at a time, and therefore the product of them
must be −1. The commutation of observables for each line means that each
corresponding random variable can be measured simultaneously, though this is
not true for all random variables in different lines. We can think of each line as
representing a particular context for the experiment.
We can multiply the left hand side of (7)–(15), and because each variable
appears twice, their product must be one (since V2i = 1, because it is a ±1-
valued random variable). However, if we multiply the right hand side of (7)–(15),
their product is −1, and we reach a contradiction. The contradiction comes from
assuming that the random variable (say, V0,0,0,1) in one experimental context
(i.e., measured with V0,0,1,0, V1,1,0,0, V1,−1,0,0) is the same as the random
variable in a different context (i.e., V0,0,0,1 in the context V0,1,0,0, V1,0,1,0,
V1,0,−1,0). Since each of the value combinations for the Vi’s correspond to
an ω in a (course-grained) probability space, it follows that there is no joint
probability distribution underlying it. Therefore the algebra of observables in
Quantum Mechanics is contextual.
It is worth mentioning that the lack of a joint probability for the above
example is a consequence of the algebra of observables being state independent.
What this means is that for any system describable by a four-dimensional Hilbert
space we will reach the above contradiction, regardless of how this system was
initially prepared. Assuming consistent connectedness (i.e. that the marginal
expectations 〈Vi〉 match between contexts), it is possible to find a negative
probability distribution that describes this system. However, such distributions
are quite large, consisting of signed probabilities for 218 = 262, 144 elementary
events.
4.4. Bell-EPR non-local contextuality
Perhaps the most celebrated example of contextuality in QM is the Bell-EPR
thought experiment, which we present here in terms of random variables. In
18
A A' B B'
Alice BobSource
Figure 5: Bell-EPR experiment. A source emits two photons, one toward Alice’s lab and
another toward Bob’s. Each experimenter can make a decision on which direction of spin to
measure, represented in the figure by the settings A and A′ for Alice and B and B′ for Bob.
Outcomes of measurements are ±1, with equal probabilities.
this experiment, two spin-1/2 particles A and B are emitted by a source and go
to opposite directions, where Alice and Bob measure them (see Figure 5). One
of the possible states that can be prepared for such a source is
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+−〉 − | −+〉) , (16)
where | + −〉 (| − +〉) corresponds to A having spin polarization “+1” (“−1”)
and B “−1” (“+1”) in the z direction10. It is clear that their spin z is negatively
correlated, as a “+1” or “−1” outcomes for particle A will result in the same
for particle B. Therefore, if Alice measures A’s spin in the z direction, then
Bob’s measurement in the same direction is moot: his experimental outcomes
are already determined by Alice’s. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen used this
example to argue that QM is incomplete: if we can know something (they
called it an “element of reality”) about particle B without affecting it (since we
measured A, whose measurement may be separated by spacelike interval from
Bob’s own measurement), then the assumption in QM that the vector (16) is a
complete description of its physical state is incorrect [29].
We can argue that there is still no mystery with QM up to now, but just an
argument that QM should be incomplete. Einstein’s proposal was to search for
a more complete theory (often called a hidden-variable theory), whereas Bohr
defended that no such theory could be satisfactorily produced. However, things
become more interesting when, following Bell, we use angles that are different
from simply measuring vertical polarization (e.g. combinations of other direc-
tions). In the 1960’s, John Bell showed that (local) hidden-variable theories
were incompatible with the predictions of QM. Stating in the formalism we put
forth, Bell showed that if QM is correct, then some random-variables variables
representing the outcomes of spacelike-separated experiments are contextual.
About a decade later, Aspect, Grangier, and Gérard [6] provided the first ev-
idence that QM was correct, and recent (loophole-free) experiments seem to
corroborate their conclusions [32].
Bell’s result comes out of the construction of a simple random variable S
defined as
S = AB+A′B+AB′ −A′B′, (17)
10The choice of the z direction is arbitrary. For simplicity we use units where ~/2 = 1.
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where A, A′, B, and B′ are ±1-valued random variables corresponding to out-
comes of experiments for Alice and Bob, with the prime denoting different spin-
measurement angles. It is straightforward to check that S can take values −2 or
2 (to verify this, one can make a table with all 16 possible values for A, A′, B,
and B′ and compute S). Therefore, the expected value of S must be between
−2 and 2, and we obtain the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequalities
(permutations of the minus sign gives you the other ones) [11]
− 2 ≤ 〈AB〉+ 〈A′B〉+ 〈AB′〉 − 〈A′B′〉 ≤ 2, (18)
where here we introduce a shorter standard notation for expectation, i.e. E (·) =
〈·〉. As in the above example for the firefly box, if (18) is violated, there is no
joint probability distribution, and the system of random variables is contextual.
The Bell-EPR setup differs significantly from the Kochen-Specker. The ran-
dom variables in Bell-EPR are necessarily consistently connected. If they were
not, it would be possible to used EPR-type correlated systems to communicate
superluminally: a choice of measurement direction by Alice would instantly
affect the mean value of Bob’s measurements, and she could use entangled par-
ticles to communicate with Bob. This would be incompatible with the causal
structure of special relativity, and would require a complete rethinking of rela-
tivistic physics. Thus, the absence of a joint probability distribution comes from
the (non-trivial) correlations imposed by the experimental outcomes (through
the values of the moments). But, more importantly, the Bell-EPR case provides
a situation where two parts of a system are correlated in ways that cannot be
explained by the existence of a common cause (hidden-variable) because they
are contextual. This is particularly disturbing to the physicist because those
two parts may be arbitrarily far away from each other, and the events that are
correlated may be spacelike separated. A striking way to see how this is difficult
to understand is if we look at a firefly box-like construction for the Bell-EPR
variables. We will not attempt to do this here, as it would be lengthy, but we
refer the interested reader to an interesting paper by Blasiak [7].
Once again, a general solution may be obtained for the joint moments in
(18), and we have the following (maybe negative, depending on whether (18) is
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violated or not) joint probability distribution:
p (ωaa′bb′) =
1
4
(〈AB〉+ 〈A′B〉+ 〈AB′〉+ 〈A′B′〉) + α3 + α4 − α7
p (ωaa′bb′) =
1
4
(〈AB〉+ 〈A′B〉) + α3 + α4 − α7,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α7,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= −1
4
(〈AB〉+ 〈A′B〉 − 〈AB′〉 − 〈A′B′〉) + α2 − α3 + α7,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= −1
4
(〈AB′〉+ 〈A′B′〉) + α1 + α3 − α7,
p (ωaa′bb′) =
1
4
(1− 〈A′B〉)− α3 − α4 − α6,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α6,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
=
1
4
(〈A′B〉 − 〈A′B′〉)− α2 + α3 + α6,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
=
1
4
(1 + 〈A′B′〉)− α1 − α3 − α6,
p (ωaa′bb′) = −1
4
(〈AB〉+ 〈AB′〉) + α1 − α4 + α5,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
=
1
4
(1 + 〈AB′〉)− α1 − α3 − α5,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
=
1
4
(1 + 〈AB〉)− α1 − α2 − α5,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α5,
p (ωaa′bb′) = α4,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α3,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α2,
p
(
ωaa′bb′
)
= α1,
where αi are free parameters. Once again, the ranges of αi depend on the values
of the moments, but one point is relevant here. On the A, B, C example, we
had only one free parameter, while here we have seven. The reason is that in
the Bell-EPR setup, only the four individual expectations and four moments
are given, and together with the requirement that
∑
p (ωi) = 1 this amounts
to 9 equations for sixteen elementary events, thus it is a more underdetermined
case.
4.5. Quantum contextuality in psychology
We did not try to give an exhaustive list of all contextual systems in QM,
but mainly those which provide further conceptual understanding of the difficul-
ties faced by physicists trying to understand quantum theory. We present those
examples to provide a background for the discussion of contextuality in psy-
chology, a theme that is at the core of current attempts to use the mathematics
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of QM to model cognition. Once again, we will not try to give an exhaustive
account of all different contextual cases, and the interested reader is referred to
Busemeyer and Bruza’s book [9]. Here we briefly examine a few cases that exem-
plify quantum-like contexts in psychology: violations of the sure-thing-principle
[4, 40] in decision making and order effects [56].
Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle was stated the following way [51, pg. 21]:
“A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property.
He considers the outcome of the next presidential election relevant
to the attractiveness of the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for
himself, he asks whether he should buy if he knew that the Repub-
lican candidate were going to win, and decides that he would do
so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that
the Democratic candidate were going to win, and again finds that
he would do so. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he de-
cides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event
obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say. It is all too sel-
dom that a decision can be arrived at on the basis of the principle
used by this businessman, but, except possibly for the assumption of
simple ordering, I know of no other extralogical principle governing
decisions that finds such ready acceptance.”
For example, imagine you have B and P as a ±1-valued random variables corre-
sponding to “not buy” (B = −1) or “buy” (B = +1), and “Republican president”
(P = −1) or “Democrat president” (P = +1). The STP corresponds to the
probabilistic statement that
P (B = 1) = P (B = 1|P = 1)P (P = 1) + P (B = 1|P = −1)P (P = −1)
≥ P (B = −1|P = 1)P (P = 1) + P (B = −1|P = −1)P (P = −1)
= P (B = −1) ,
if
P (B = 1|P = 1) ≥ P (B = −1|P = 1)
and
P (B = 1|P = 1) ≥ P (B = −1|P = 1) .
Tversky and Shafir showed that human decision makers often do not follow
the STP [52, 55]. Since STP follows in a straightforward way from the axioms
of probability theory, violations of STP by human decision makers imply they
do not follow those axioms themselves, but perhaps some type of generalized
probability theory. Such generalized probability theory, as some have proposed,
is the one given by probabilities defined over an orthomodular lattice resulting
from measures over a Hilbert space, i.e., quantum probabilities [8].
For example, the STP can be given by a quantum description of the MZI
paradigm [21]. In the MZI, where which path information causes a collapse of the
wave function, therefore changing the probability distributions of the outcomes
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of the experiment. So, if we use the analogy that in the MZI the responses “buy”
or “not buy” correspond to detectors at the end of the interferometer, and the
which-path information corresponding to “Republican president” or “Democrat
president,” the collapse of the wave function would change the distributions of
“buy” or “not buy” depending on the context of knowing which is president,
similar to the Tversky and Shafir’s experiments. Therefore, violations of STP
show a clear case of contextuality. However, it is obviously trivial contextuality,
since the “measurement” of which-path creates a direct change in the expectation
values of the “buy”/“not buy” random variable.
We now turn to order effects. Order effects are well-known in quantum sys-
tems, where successive measurements of incompatible quantities (e.g. spin in
two orthogonal directions) give different results depending on the order. Re-
cently, in a model similar to the quantum model for the MZI, Wang et al. [56],
showed that not only can quantum models correctly reproduce the observed or-
der effect of outcomes of many different experiments, but they can also predict
a non-trivial relation for the order effect: the QQ equality. This equality, which
holds exactly for the quantum formalism, seems to also hold with good fit for
most order effect experiments investigated by Wang et al., a surprising finding,
since it seems the QQ equality cannot be derived in any straightforward way
from other approaches. However, as in the STP example, the random variables
are inconsistently connected.
5. Final remarks
In this paper we described negative probabilities, and showed how they can
be used to describe some contextual systems. We tried to show in the examples
some of the cases where negative probabilities work well, but also those where no
clear approach with negative probabilities exist (i.e. for inconsistently connected
systems). Our goal was to provide a different approach to contextual systems
than the formalism of Quantum Mechanics, one that may perhaps be useful in
quantum cognition. The advantage of NP is that it can model not only those
situations where QM is applied, but it is also more general.
As an example, let us think about the three-sided firefly box. In QM, if we
have three observables that can be observed simultaneously in pairs, it follows
that they can also be observed all together. This is a characteristic of the Hilbert
space formalism, and can be easily demonstrated (see [13, 16]). However, it is
also possible to show that, under certain reasonable assumptions, one should
expect a neural stimulus-response model to be able to reproduce the types of
correlations that we find in the three random variable case, where no joint
probability distribution exists [14, 20]. Thus, we are left with the possibility of
a plausible contextual system that is forbidden by the quantum formalism and
that can easily be described by NP, as we saw in Section 4. Additionally, as
mentioned earlier, there are many surprising theorems in QM that seem to have
no counterparts in psychology or social sciences, and a more general contextual
theory of probabilities might be advantageous.
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We should point out that despite all the discussions about contextuality in
social systems, recently Dzhafarov, Zhang, and Kujala analyzed many psychol-
ogy experiments, and found no evidence of non-trivial contextuality [23]. This
means that more subtle examples, such as the firefly box or systems equivalent
to the Bell-EPR where contextuality comes from the correlations and not from
inconsistently connected random variables, were not found. Their analysis was
made using the apparatus of Contextuality-by-Default, an approach that is more
general than the NP. This does not mean that NP are not necessarily useful in
the social sciences, but it seems that up to now attempts to find non-trivially
contextual systems have failed.
As we saw in the examples, as well as in the discussions that followed Propo-
sition 6, the minimum value of the L1 norm, M∗, can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of contextuality [17]. This is connected to standard views in QM, where
the values of 〈S〉 (equation (17)) are taken as a measure of departure from lo-
cality for Bell-EPR systems, with higher values of 〈S〉 corresponding to more
non-local systems (therefore more contextual). This is also true for the three
random variable system A, B, and C, where M∗ is associated to the expecta-
tion of AB+BC+AC present in equation (2). It would be interesting to see
how M∗ compares to other measures of contextuality, namely the one given by
Contextuality-by-Default, for more complex systems, and whether interesting
classifications can arise from different measures of contextuality.
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